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NOTE
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT IN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT:
AN ILLUSTRATION
INTRODUCTION

Until just a few years ago, state regulation of land use in the
United States consisted mainly of zoning ordinances instituted
by local governments.' However, in the last 5 years state concern
with the control of land use has caused a dramatic increase in the
number and forms of state land use regulations.' This increase
illustrates that there has been an expansion in the scope of regulation in regard to both the levels of government regulating land
use and the criteria upon which such regulatory decisions are
based. Thus, today one can see land use being regulated at state,
regional,3 and local levels, in accordance with a broad range of
criteria, including such considerations as the environmental impact of the proposed land use.' Besides indicating an expansion
in scope, a survey of the many and various forms of state land use
regulation indicates that states are becoming more innovative in
land use legislation, adopting different approaches to the problems of land use control.5 For example, regulation of land use at
the state level may be by a comprehensive land use management
system, as found in Hawaii,6 or by a system which regulates only
certain activities, as does the Maine "Site Location of Development" statute.' The effect of the expansion in both scope and
variety of legislation is that more and more land use activities are
becoming subject to state regulation.
F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 1-3 (1971).
See generally F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 1; Freilich, Development
Timing, Moratoria and Controlling Growth, in 1974 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 147.
Freilich, supra note 2, at 212-17.
An excellent example of the current trend to expand the criteria for local land use
regulation is the Colorado Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974,
Coi.o. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-20-101 to -107 (Supp. 1975).
' Best, Recent State Initiatives on Power Plant Siting: A Report and Comment, 5
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 668 (1972); Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of
Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1972).
1 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-1 to -37 (Supp. 1975).
7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-89 (Supp. 1976).
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There has been a growing national concern and growing federal involvement in energy matters, which has taken place concurrently with the expansion of state land use regulation. President Ford's emphasis on energy problems in his State of the
Union Address delivered on January 15, 1975,8 and his later proposals for new legislation to increase domestic energy supplies9
exemplify the fact that today energy development is a highpriority national policy. This national concern for energy development has resulted in considerable federal legislation; for example,
in 1974 alone Congress passed the Federal Energy Administration
Act,'" the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act,"
and the Energy Reorganization Act." Also illustrative of the high
federal priority accorded energy development is the fact that
Congress, by enacting the Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974,' 3 amended the Clean Air Act" to set
back timetables for reducing pollution and to encourage the conversion of power plants to coal, even though the burning of coal
would increase air pollution.'" The latest pronouncement of Congress' concern with energy development is the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975'" which states that the purpose of the
act is "to increase the supply of fossil fuels in the United States
through price incentives and production requirements."'"
The inevitable result of expanding state control of land use
and increasing federal energy legislation is a collision of state and
federal interests. In particular, the difference between state and
federal priorities for energy development and environmental conservation portends an ultimate federal-state conflict of major proportions. The phrase "federal-state conflict" is somewhat misleading; while it connotes a struggle between relative equals, ac11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 45, 48-51 (1975).

See, e.g., Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Increase Energy Supply and Availability, January
30, 1975, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 119 (1975).
15 U.S.C. §§ 761-86 (Supp. IV, 1974).
88 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
12 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. 1976).
,3 88 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970).
'5 Id. § 1857f-l(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10 (Supp. IV, 1974).
" 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp., March 1, 1976).
" Id. § 6201.
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tually the parties are far from being equal. The United States
Constitution established a union of equal states, but at the same
time created a federal system of government under which the
federal government was granted certain prerogatives in relation
to the states. This potential federal-state conflict in the field of
energy development appears in three major situations where federal prerogatives may invalidate state regulation: (1) When the
activities regulated by the state are also subject to federal regulation or regulatory schemes, raising the question of federal
preemption; (2) when, even in the absence of federal regulation,
the state regulation may by its very nature be repugnant to one
of the enumerated powers of the federal government; and (3)
when state regulation affects land over which the federal government has dominion.
This note will analyze how these federal prerogatives affect
state-wide land use regulation in the context of one state regulatory scheme-the Wyoming Industrial Development Information
and Siting Act."8 This Act is particularly appropriate for study for
several reasons. It specifically regulates facilities which develop
energy resources.'" It is comprehensive in that its decisionmaking
criteria include social, economic, and environmental considerations. 10 It is one of the most recent examples of state land use
regulation." Its regulation of site selection represents an approach
to land use regulation which is presently utilized in Maine,22 and
which has been under consideration for use in Colorado.2 3 In addition, almost half the land in Wyoming is public land under the
24
dominion of the federal government.
" WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-502.75 to -.94 (Cum. Supp. 1975) [hereinafter referred to
in text as the Wyoming Act].
Id. § 35-502.76(c)(i).
Id. § 35-502.87.
The rules and regulations implementing the Wyoming Act became effective on
September 30, 1975, and, at the time of this writing, the first permit application is being
processed.
2 The Maine statute has withstood several challenges to its validity. See In re Maine
Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d
736 (Me. 1973).
An energy facility siting bill entitled the "Energy Development and Conservation
Act" (H.B. 1253) passed the Colorado House on March 12, 1976, but was postponed
indefinitely by the Senate on March 30, 1976.
24 U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND 327
(1970).
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In analyzing the question of whether federal prerogatives can
invalidate the operation of the Wyoming Act, this note will examine the following issues: (1) Whether there is federal preemption
in the context of energy development facilities subject to both
state and federal control; (2) whether the Wyoming Act unduly
burdens interstate commerce; and (3) what effect federal ownership of land, including ownership of subsurface mineral rights,
will have on present and future state regulation of that land.
I.

THE WYOMING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION AND

SITING ACT

The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act, which became law on March 8, 1975, is an example of
state legislation requiring approval at the state level before any
major industrial facility can be constructed in the state. 25 The
statute applies to any industrial facility with an estimated construction cost of at least $50 million, and to any energy generating
and conversion plant designed for, or capable of, producing certain threshold amounts of electricity, synthetic gas, liquid hydro2
carbon products, or enriched uranium.
An application for a permit to construct a major industrial
facility must contain 16 items of information, including inventories of various pollutants caused by the proposed facility, and
either a preliminary evaluation of any social, economic, or environmental impact upon local governments or special districts, or
plans and proposals for alleviating such impact. 27 These evaluations or proposals must also specifically discuss the impact on
other categorical areas.Y The applicant must also pay an initial
fee to cover the cost of investigating, reviewing, and processing
the application. This fee may be as high as 0.5 percent of the
but
estimated cost of construction or $100,000, whichever is less,
21
applicant.
the
to
refunded
are
fee
the
of
unused portions
21 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.80 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
21 Id.

§ 35-502.76(c).

21Id. § 35-502.81(a).

21The areas which must be discussed include the following: Natural, recreational,
archeological, and historical resources; sewer, water, fire, police, health, and hospital
facilities; land use patterns; education; housing; transportation; and anticipated growth
of satellite industries. Id. § 35-502.81(a)(xii).
2 Id. § 35-502.81(b).
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After the application is received, a public hearing must be
held. At that time the applicant may present evidence that the
facility complies with all applicable law, that it will not pose a
threat of serious injury to the environment or to the social and
economic condition of the local inhabitants, and that it will not
substantially impair their health, safety, or welfare.30 After this
hearing, the Industrial Siting Council may either approve the
application and issue a permit, with or without conditions, or
reject the application pending further study. 3' If further study is
required by the council, and if the applicant still wishes to obtain
a permit, the applicant must pay an additional fee to cover the
expenses3 of an intensive study and evaluation of the proposed
facility. 1
The council must grant a permit when the following conditions are met: (1) The probable environmental effect is acceptable; (2) any adverse environmental impact is reduced to a minimum; (3) the facility is compatible with state, regional, and local
land use plans; (4) the facility or its cumulative effects will not
violate state and federal standards and implementation plans;
and (5) the facility will have an acceptable impact upon the
environmental, social, and economic well-being of the municipalities and people in the area.3
The Wyoming Industrial Siting Council implemented the
Wyoming Act by issuing its Rules and Regulations, which became
effective on September 30, 1975.11 The Rules and Regulations set
forth in considerable detail the requirements for the initial application.3 1 More importantly, the Rules and Regulations define key
terminology in the Act. The applicant, to demonstrate that the
Id. §§ 35-502.82(b),(c).
Id. § 35-502.82(e).
312The Wyoming Act lists 8 major topics and 56 subtopics which may be required for
further study. The Office of Industrial Siting Administration is required to obtain information and recommendations from 13 state agencies (including the University of
Wyoming). Id. §§ 35-502.83(a),(b). The additional fee required to cover the expenses of
this study may be as high as $1 million. Id. § 35-502.83(b).
Id. § 35-502.87.
Industrial Development Information and Siting Rules and Regulations, §§ 1 to 15,
Sept. 8, 1975 [hereinafter referred to in text as Rules and Regulations].
3 These requirements include providing data on such diverse subjects as job classifications at the proposed facility, existing library facilities in the area, regional meteorology,
occupational noise exposure within the areas of site influence, and ozone generation of
transmission lines. Id. § 5.
"
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facility will not pose a "threat of serious injury," must show that
the granting of a permit will not result in a "significant detriment
to, or impairment of, the environment or the social and economic
condition of present or expected inhabitants."3 The Rules and
Regulations also define "environment," "social condition," and
"economic conditions" in very broad terms."
Before discussing the federal prerogatives which bear on this
Act, it is necessary to inquire whether the Act itself is a valid
exercise of state authority. As shown by the decisionmaking criteria, the purpose of the Act-to protect the public health, safety,
and general welfare-places it within traditional state police
power.3 As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
regard to the Maine siting regulation:
We consider it indisputable that the limitation of use of property for the purpose of preserving from unreasonable destruction the
quality of air, soil, and water for the protection of the public health
and welfare is within the police power.3"

Even though such regulation is within the power of the state,
it must not be unconstitutionally vague. The preceding summary
of the Act and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder indicates a clear delineation of criteria for issuance or denial
of a permit.'" Such criteria have been upheld by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine.4 Thus, assuming that the Wyoming Act
is administered in a reasonable manner so as to preclude any
42
charge that it is merely a guise to halt development and growth,
Id. § 6(b).
§§ 6(b)(1) - (b)(3). For example, a "serious injury" to the social condition of
the inhabitants includes any "significant" decrease in the quality of the transportation
system. Id. § 6(b)(2). To demonstrate that the proposed facility will not "substantially
impair the health, safety, or welfare" of the inhabitants the applicant also has a considerable burden. "Health" is defined to include psychological as well as physical well-being,
and "safety" is defined to mean freedom from fear of injury, where this fear may be
premised on crime rates, traffic accident rates, or dangers of industrial accidents. Id. §
6(c).
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
u

31Id.

" In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 748 (Me. 1973).

See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
See note 39 supra.
,2Courts have invalidated attempts by communities to immunize themselves from
growth or to otherwise exclude groups of people from joining the community. See, e.g.,
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972);
National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). Contra,
Construction Indus. Assoc. v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148
3'

"

(1976).
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it is likely to be upheld as a valid exercise of state authority.
However, the degree to which this control can actually be exerted
is limited by federal prerogatives which bear on the state system.
II.

A.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Theory

Federal preemption finds its basis in the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, which states that the Constitution and laws of the United States are to be supreme, notwithstanding state constitutions and laws to the contrary.43 Between
those powers which the Constitution denies the states"4 and those
which it reserves to the states 5 lies a broad range of powers capable of being exercised concurrently by the states and the federal
government. This range of concurrent powers is quite large because, although those powers enumerated by the Constitution
and delegated to the federal government are generally prohibited
to the states, the Constitution also delegates to the federal government broad general powers to provide for the "general welfare"" and to make all laws "necessary and proper"' 7 to effectuate
its other powers. It is federal regulation under the authority of
these general powers that creates a conflict with state regulation.
Where the nature of the power is such that it may be held
concurrently,'" preemption of state regulation by federal regulation or regulatory schemes depends on whether or not Congress
has exercised its power so as to exclude the states from asserting
concurrent jurisdiction. 9 The United States Supreme Court has
found preemption in three basic situations: (1) Where the state
and federal regulations conflict so that compliance with both is
impossible; s° (2) where Congress had declared its regulation to be
exclusive;5 or (3) where there is an implied congressional intent
art. VI.
10.
" Id. amend. X.
,S Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
,7 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
" See note 111 infra.
" See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
" See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233 (1947); Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 299 (1961).
"3 U.S. CONST.
" Id. art. I, §
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that the regulation be exclusive.5" The Supreme Court has indicated that exclusiveness may be implied: If indicated in the legislative history of the federal regulation or regulatory scheme; 3 if
the federal regulatory scheme is pervasive; 4 if the nature of the
regulation or the subject matter is such that it requires nationwide uniformity;5 or if the state regulation frustrates congressional purposes and objectives."
While the theory of federal preemption can be simply stated,
it, like all doctrines based on broad philosophical considerations,
is very difficult to apply. The Supreme Court has said:
In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether,
under the circumstances of the particular case, [the state's] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.57

Where the regulation is an exercise of the state's traditional police
powers, as is the Wyoming Act, the Court is even more uncertain.
It has said:
It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures
has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the
state and federal regulations collide." s

The Court, in applying these tests, has given some deference to
state regulations which are an exercise of the police power:
In determining whether state regulation has been preempted by
federal action, "the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of
its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation
is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.""
52See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S.
767, 772 (1947).
11See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-50
(1963).
11City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); cf. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State
Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
5' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
57 Id.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
5gHuron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) quoting
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This deference to police power regulation has been expressed succinctly by two federal courts of appeals: "It is well settled that
where the state's police power is involved, preemption will not be
presumed."60
While the Wyoming Act may be a valid exercise of the state's
police power, the implementation of the regulation, if it restricts
energy development, may also frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress. This dichotomy highlights one major difficulty
in applying the doctrine of preemption: The outcome of a particular case will depend on how the Court chooses to apply the conflicting police-power/preemption tests. This situation has produced an inconsistency in preemption cases which has been criticized by commentators."' The doctrine of preemption is, therefore, far from being clear cut in its application, and the outcome
of any litigation in which the question of federal preemption may
be raised will probably depend mainly upon the facts of the particular case.
More particularly, the issue of preemption of the Wyoming
Act arises because of its regulation of energy development facilities which are also regulated by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
B.

FPC Regulation of Energy Facilities

The FPC regulates three types of facilities: (1) Facilities
which develop water power and water resources; 2 (2) natural gas
companies engaged in interstate commerce;" and (3) electric utility companies engaged in interstate commerce.6
1.

Water Power and Resource Facilities

The FPC has extensive authority over the siting of hydroelecSavage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 324 n.8 (1st Cir. 1969), quoted in Chrysler
Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir. 1969).
"I See, e.g., Abraham & Loder, The Supreme Court and the Preemption Question,
53 Ky. L. J. 289, 311-35 (1965). The Supreme Court has also been criticized for confusing
preemption with other doctrines, Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrineof
Federal Preemption, 22 J. OF PUBLIC L. 391 (1973), and for using the doctrine to avoid
reaching other issues. Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
" 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 717 (1970).
" 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1970).
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tric power facilities. Through the Federal Power Act, 5 Congress
established the FPC and set up a regulatory system requiring
anyone desiring to construct, operate, or maintain any facility for
the development or improvement of navigation, or for the development or utilization of water power, to obtain a license from the
FPC."6 The Act also gave the FPC broad authority to condition
the issuance of these licenses." The Supreme Court has made it
clear that the federal government has complete authority over the
development of water power, 8 and that Congress embodies its full
constitutional authority in the FPC.6 9
Not only does the FPC's authority extend to its licensees, but
the agency may have an effect upon the legal relationship between a licensee and the state so as to supersede state law. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a municipality (which
only exists as a creation of state law) can, in its capacity as an
FPC licensee, condemn state land even though such condemnation is prohibited by state law." However, the FPC's authority
over water resources does have some limits. The Supreme Court
has held that the FPC does not have licensing authority over
thermal-electric power plants, even when such plants draw considerable amounts of water from navigable waters of the United
States."
The ability of this federal regulatory scheme to preempt state
regulation is clearly demonstrated in First Iowa Hydro-Electric
Cooperative v. FPC,"1 in which the Supreme Court held that a
state cannot impose permit requirements on an applicant for an
FPC license for a hydroelectric power project. Although the Federal Power Act 3 provided that an applicant must submit
"[s]atisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1970). The act as originally passed was entitled the Federal
Water Power Act and only dealt with control of water power and water resources. The title
was changed to the Federal Power Act in 1935 when the FPC's regulatory authority was
extended to electric utility companies.
60Id. § 797(e) (1970).
'7 Id. § 803.
6" United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
" FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965).
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395 (1975).
72

328 U.S. 152 (1946).

71

16 U.S.C.

§§ 791a-828c

(1970).
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the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which
the proposed project is to be located . . . ,," the Court interpreted this provision to be informational in character, referring
merely to those matters over which the state does have jurisdiction, such as the title to water rights within its borders.7"
The Court, in First Iowa, said that to condition an FPC license on the obtaining of a prior state permit would "vest" in the
state a "veto power" over the federal project,76 thereby indicating
that state permit requirements are of no ultimate effect on an
applicant for an FPC license.
Moreover, the state permit to construct the facility had been
refused because state law expressed a policy that water should
not be diverted." The FPC, on the other hand, had deemed the
applicant's proposal inadequate and undesirable until the proposal was modified to include a major diversion of water.7" This
was, for the Court, an example of a situation where the state law
"strikes at the heart" of a federal project.79
The permit requirements of the Wyoming Act, on the other
hand, are not directly opposed to a federal policy of energy development, but merely attempt to channel the development to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Regardless of
the nature of the permit system, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the federal government has dominion over water
power.8 0 Thus, if an applicant is granted a federal license to construct a hydroelectric power project in Wyoming, lack of state
approval of the site will probably not be sufficient to stop the
construction. However, the Wyoming Act can be characterized as
informational as well as regulatory. Hence, a good argument can
be made that, even if the FPC licensing authority preempts the
state requirements of prior site approval, the informational aspects of the Wyoming Act, including the disclosure and public
hearing requirements, should be upheld, since they do not affect
or oppose the federal regulatory scheme.
Id. § 802(b).
First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 177-80 (1946).
, Id. at 164.
" Id. at 166.
" Id. at 160, 166.
, Id. at 166.
* See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
"
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Natural Gas Companies

The question of whether the regulatory system of the FPC
preempts the Wyoming Act can also be raised in regard to natural
gas companies. While the Wyoming Act requires site approval for
facilities which produce synthetic gas,' rather than natural gas,
a facility producing natural gas may come under the requirements of the Act, if its construction cost is more than $50 million.81
The relationship between state and federal jurisdiction over
natural gas companies is quite different from that of water power
development. The Supreme Court, interpreting the Natural Gas
Act of 19388 and its legislative hsitory, has concluded that, although Congress intended to create a comprehensive regulation
of the natural gas industry, this was to be a dual system of regulation; the federal government, rather than displacing the state
systems, was merely filling in the gaps where there was no state
regulation."4 This conclusion indicates that any aspects of the
natural gas industry which are regulated by the states under their
traditional police powers should not be displaced by regulation of
the FPC. Accordingly, the FPC can regulate interstate commerce
carried on by natural gas companies, and the State of Wyoming,
under its police power, can regulate the siting of such facilities.
That Wyoming can regulate siting is further supported by
the Natural Gas Act itself. The Act states that the FPC's authority does not apply to the "production or gathering" of natural
gas." As the FPC cannot regulate the production of natural gas,
it has no authority over the siting of a plant.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has
been liberal in defining the FPC's authority over natural gas companies. For example, in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,8
the Supreme Court held that the federal curtailment programs
could be applied to intrastate customers, 7 even though the sale
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.76(c)(i)(B), -502.80 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
s2 Id. § 35-502.76(c)(ii).

15 U.S.C. §§ 717 to 717w (1970).
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Panhandle Eastem Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).

" 15 U.S.C. § 717(b).
" 406 U.S. 621 (1972).

17Id. See also Carver, The Trend to State Protectionism in Natural Resource
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of natural gas for intrastate consumption, albeit by a company
doing interstate business, appears from the Natural Gas Act to
be under the jurisdiction of the states.88 In extending FPC jurisdiction, the Court based its holding on the theories that state
regulation of "direct sales" customers applied only to rate-setting
and that the FPC had broad authority to regulate the transportation of natural gas. 9
This case also illustrates an important issue in any application of the tests for preemption: Is the matter alleged to be
preempted from state regulation within the delegated authority
of the federal agency implementing the regulatory scheme? In
Louisiana Power the Supreme Court stated that, although curtailment plans by their very nature require uniformity of application and the states regulate with a view to their own interests, the
need for federal jurisdiction does not in itself give the FPC the
authority to regulate, as this authority must come from Congress. 0 Although the need for uniformity of regulation and for an
unhampered national policy have each been sufficient to invoke
federal preemption in other cases,9 they cannot give a federal
agency jurisdiction. Therefore, in any situation where preemption
may be implied from a federal regulatory scheme, and where a
federal agency administers the scheme, it must first be determined whether authority over the subject has been expressly delegated by Congress to the agency.
3.

Electric Utility Companies

The Wyoming Act requires site approval for facilities which
produce electricity.2 However, the Federal Power Act 3 grants the
FPC authority to regulate electric utility companies engaged in
interstate commerce. Unless otherwise provided, the FPC does
not have jurisdiction over facilities for the generation of electricity nor the transmission of electrical energy in intrastate commerce. 4 The FPC's authority over facilities producing electric
Management, 18

ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 253 (1973).
15 U.S.C. § 717(c).
406 U.S. at 640.
90 Id. at 633-36.
" See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
0 WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-502.76(c)(i)(A), -502.80 (Cum.Supp. 1975).
93 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1970).
" Id. § 824(b).
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energy is, therefore, limited primarily to the sale of electricity in
interstate commerce.
Although the Federal Power Act does state that one of the
purposes of the FPC is to assure an abundant supply of electricity, it speaks of achieving this purpose solely in the context of the
"interconnection" and "coordination" of facilities. Even in this
limited context the language is that of request, not command,
with the coordination of facilities being merely "voluntary" on
the part of the individual facilities. 5 What authority the FPC
does have over the supply of electricity is limited in scope and
insufficient to overcome the Federal Power Act's general denial
of FPC authority to regulate the generation of electricity. Therefore, this authority should not affect the operation of the Wyoming Act.9
C.

NRC Regulation of Energy Facilities

The Wyoming Act also applies to nuclear power plants which
produce certain threshold amounts of electricity 7 and to uranium
enrichment facilities capable of producing a specific output.9
Both types of facilities are subject to regulation by the NRC. 9
Although the question of federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear energy is currently of great interest, 0 the issue of
federal preemption of siting regulations has not been resolved by
the courts. However, should the issue come squarely before the
courts, two particular cases may shed some light on the possible
outcome.
In Northern CaliforniaAssociation to PreserveBodega Head
Id. § 824a(a).
" It should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that private energy producing
facilities are to be considered as engaging in interstate commerce, if the energy produced
is comingled with energy from another energy producing facility which is engaged in
interstate commerce. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
11 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.76(c)(i)(A) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
" Id. § 35-502.76(c)(i)(D).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-34 (1970).
'" See, e.g., Estep & Aldeman, State Control of RadiationHazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1967); Helman, Pre-Emption:Approaching Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQUETTE L. REV.
43 (1967); Martone, Federaland State Responsibilitiesin the Environmental Control of
Nuclear Power Plants, 2 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 20 (1972); Comment, Power
Play in the Nuclear Arena, 53 DENVER L.J. 228 (1976).

1976

FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT

& Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission,'0' the California
Supreme Court held that a state does have the power to determine the location of nuclear reactors, on the basis of safety factors
other than radiation hazards. To the contrary, however, is
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,02 in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that under the doctrine of preemption, the federal government has exclusive authority to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants, which necessarily includes the regulation of levels of radioactive effluents from the plant.' 3 The Eighth Circuit thereby
invalidated state standards regarding allowable radioactive discharges which were stricter than the federal standards.' 4 In holding that the state regulation was preempted by federal regulation,
the court found that Congress intended to exclude regulation of
radiation hazards from state control;1 5 that the federal regulatory
scheme was pervasive; 0° and that the subject matter required
uniform regulation to effectuate the objectives of Congress.' 7
These two cases, of course, are not determinative of the siting
issue. The California case specifically permits a state to regulate
siting, but only where there is a safety question involved. 08 The
Eighth Circuit case, while holding that state regulation was
preempted, did not specifically address the siting issue.
There are strong arguments on both sides of the question of
federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear facility siting.
Although the development of atomic energy was initially an outgrowth of the important federal interest in national defense,
today atomic energy is developed for many peaceful purposes.
This change in the nature of atomic energy is reflected in the 1959
" 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
"o 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
"o Id. at 1154.
104 Id. at 1145.
105 Id. at 1147-52.
,6Id. at 1152-53.
Id. at 1153-54.
The California Supreme Court justified state regulation of the siting of nuclear
reactors by saying that the location of a reactor at or near an active earthquake fault zone
was a safety consideration which the federal government did not address, and, therefore,
the federal government clearly did not preempt the entire field of safety, but only that
portion relating to radiation hazards. Northern Calif. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head &
Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 133, 390 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr.
432, 436 (1964).
"o
"
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amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, 09 in which Congress recognized the peaceful purposes of nuclear energy and stated that
the states are to have a role in its development."10 Arguably, the
nature of atomic energy has clearly changed so as to preclude any
necessity for preemption of state regulation. Although the technical complexity of the regulation of actual construction and operation of a nuclear facility may currently be best accomplished by
federal regulation, such matters as siting, which are local in nature and well within the competence of the states, should be
regulated by the states."'
Moreover, a valid police power regulation concerning the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of a state should not be
preempted unless there is an express congressional exclusion of
state regulation."' Both the legislative history and amendments
to the Atomic Energy Act"3 make it clear that not all facets of
4
state regulation of nuclear facilities are to be preempted.1
Even if federal preemption applies to any regulation affecting the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, state requirements for site approval are not regulation of either the
construction or the operation of nuclear facilities. Therefore such
regulation is arguably beyond the scope of the federal regulatory
scheme and not subject to preemption. The language of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974"' 1 indicates that the NRC does
not have congressional authority to require the siting of nuclear
'o 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).

,,8 Id. § 2021.
' The Supreme Court has expressed the idea that state regulation of matters of
fundamentally local concern should only be preempted upon a showing of positive evidence that Congress intended to oust the state from regulating the matter. Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1963).
"I See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
" The 1959 amendments to the act state that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to effect the authority of any
state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.
Id. § 2021(k). In its Section-by-Section Analysis of the 1959 amendments to the act, the
Joint Committee Report stated:
This subsection is intended to make it clear that the bill does not impair
the State authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the manifold
health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection.
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2882.
1" 42 U.S.C.A. 99 5801-91 (Supp. 1976).
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facilities at particular locations. While this statute appears to
support the view that the NRC has no direct authority to regulate
site selection, it does provide an expression of national policy on
nuclear facility site selection. Such an expression could support
a finding of federal preemption where state requirements for site
approval frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress.",
The arguments supporting federal preemption are set forth
in Northern States Power:"' The pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, the need for uniformity of regulation, and the
congressional intent to exclude state regulation of the subject
matter."' Arguably, since the Atomic Energy Act authorizes federal regulation of the construction of nuclear facilities by licensing," 9 and construction inherently involves the selection of a site,
congressional exclusion of state regulation of construction"
preempts state regulation of siting.
However, these arguments do not address the question of
valid state police power. The Eighth Circuit in Northern States
Power'2 ' did speak to this issue in its discussion of the need for
uniformity of regulation. The court noted that congressional
objectives expressed in the 1954 amendments of the Atomic Energy Act evinced a legislative design to foster and encourage the
development and control of atomic energy to make the maximum
contribution to the general welfare. 2 ' This design was to be effectuated consistently with the common defense and with the health
and safety of the public.'2 The court concluded that Congress had
vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the question of the

"' Section 207 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 establishes a Nuclear Energy
Center Site Survey by directing the NRC to make a national survey of possible sites for
nuclear facilities, including those which produce enriched uranium. Id. § 5847(a). The
NRC is to conduct the survey in cooperation with other interested federal, state, and local
agencies and is authorized to adopt policies which will "encourage" the location of nuclear
facilities at these sites. Id. § 5847(a)(1), (4).
117447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
I" Id. at 1147-54. Commentators on the federal system of regulation of atomic energy
clearly give support to the arguments of pervasiveness and the need for uniformity. E.
STASON, S. ESTEP, & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 1059 (1954); Shapar, Licensing of
Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States - New Developments, 15 ATOMIC ENERGY
L.J. 135 (1973).
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-34, 2235 (1970).
" Id. § 2021(c)(1); See 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2880-81.
1 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
'" Id. at 1153.
12 Id.
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proper balance between desired industrial progress and adequate
health and safety standards, and that only a uniform system
could accomplish these dual objectives.'24 In other words, public
health and safety were not the ultimate considerations but were
factors to be considered by the federal government. Thus, even a
valid exercise of a state's police power could be preempted if
Congress intended that health and safety must be weighed with
other factors and that this weighing occur at the federal level.
In regard to the Wyoming Act, the question of preemption
clearly presents itself when site approval is required for a facility
whose construction must also be licensed by the NRC. Although
the environmental report required by the NRC must include information about the status of the applicant's compliance with
appropriate environmental quality standards and zoning and
land use regulation, 5 a court could view this requirement as
being purely informational in character and not providing any
state jurisdiction over the regulation of a federally licensed facil126
ity.
In essence, the issue is whether one mechanically applies the
tests given for preemption or shows some deference to the fact
that the Wyoming Act is a valid police power regulation. While
the Eighth Circuit in Northern States Power based its holding on
the usual preemption tests, the better criteria would seem to be
those given by the dissent in that case:
[TIn our present case the trial court decided the case on the basis
of absolute preemption as a matter of law and refused to permit
testimony on the reasonableness of the state regulations or the
balancing of environmental protection against the desired development of the use of atomic energy. The court made no findings upon
such issue. The issue of reasonableness of the state regulations and
of whether they were so burdensome as to frustrate the development
of atomic energy is not properly before us.'2

Although this dissent appears to be a restatement of previously
cited Supreme Court holdings giving deference to state police
power regulations, 128 the authority of these decisions was not apI Id. at 1153-54.
C.F.R. § 51.20(c) (1975).
2 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 177-80 (1946); See text accom-

121 10

panying notes 72-75 supra.
2' 447 F.2d at 1158 (Van Oosterhout, J., dissenting).
21 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
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plied by the majority. The failure of the Supreme Court to clarify
this inconsistency in its memorandum affirmation" 9 is indicative
of the ambiguities arising from the Court's treatment of policepower/preemption issues.
As an exercise of state police power, the Wyoming Act reasonably accomplishes the goal of protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens of Wyoming, and therefore would seem
to be valid under the police power reasonableness test.""0 However, as Northern States Power demonstrates, the doctrine of
preemption is broad enough to allow a finding as a matter of law
that the NRC's authority preempts the Wyoming Act.' 3 ' Despite
the Supreme Court's long-standing assertion that the police
power is "one of the most essential powers of government, one
that is least limitable,"' 32 the express congressional exclusion of
state regulation of nuclear facility construction 3 makes it highly
unlikely that a court would allow a state to prohibit such construction. This is especially so in light of the national policy encouraging reliance on nuclear energy and the impending shortage
of the enriched uranium needed to fuel nuclear power plants.'
Should a coart find that the Wyoming Act as applied indicates a
pattern of interference with the development of nuclear energy,
it would be invalidated as a frustration of national policy.
HI.

COMMERCE CLAUSE

The preceding section detailed how, under the authority of
the supremacy clause, federal regulations or regulatory schemes
may preempt state regulations. This section will address a second
category of federal prerogatives which, while also based on the
supremacy clause, occurs in the absence of federal legislation.
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
"" For a discussion of the Wyoming Act's detailed standards and its viability due to
a funding procedure which insures the kinds of studies needed for competent decisionmaking, see notes 27-37 and accompanying text supra.
" Though Northern States Power is distinguishable in that it dealt with an area
expressly excluded from state regulation by Congress, the alternative preemption grounds
which were used indicate that a federal court could find the Wyoming Act preempted by
federal regulation.
"I Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915), cited in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
'
See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
'3' President Ford's State of the Union Address, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 45
(1975); Hennessey, Legal Aspects of Uranium Enrichment, 14 ATOMic ENERGY L.J. 219,
220 (1972).
12'
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As stated earlier, the enumerated powers of Congress are
generally exclusive in nature and admit of only congressional
exercise of the power.'3 If any state regulation or statute affects,
even indirectly, Congress' power to exercise its exclusive powers,
it could be found repugnant to that enumerated power and would
be invalidated under the supremacy clause. For example, in
Zschernig v.Miller 136 the Supreme Court held that the Oregon
escheat statute regulating the rights of foreign heirs to receive
property was invalid. The Court found that the statute, as construed by the Oregon courts, affected international relations, authority over which is committed by the Constitution to Congress
and the President, in a "persistent and subtle way."' 137 The assertions of counsel for the United States that the application of the
Oregon escheat law did not, in the circumstances of the case,
unduly interfere with the United States' conduct of13 foreign relations were not found to require a different holding.
In determining whether the Wyoming Act may be invalidated by this federal prerogative, one must first ask which of the
federal government's enumerated powers may be affected by this
particular state regulation. The regulation of site selection for
hydroelectric power projects could affect federal control over navigable waters, derived from Congress' authority under the commerce clause. 3 Also, the regulation of site selection of nuclear
facilities could be construed as affecting national security because of the early ties between national defense and the development of atomic power." 40 As we have seen, in both of these situations Congress has delegated its authority to federal agencies
which are actively regulating those facilities."'
The Wyoming Act, in its regulation of site selection of facilities which deal in commodities (both electricity and fuels) which
"- See text accompanying notes 44-47; the Constitution's delegation to Congress of
the power to exercise exclusive legislation for the District of Columbia is one example of
an enumerated power which clearly precludes any state regulation. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl.17.
136 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
's Id. at 440.
' Id. at 443 (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
131U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,cl.
3.
"I See Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy's report on the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946, 1946 U.S. CoDE CONG. SERV. 1327.
"' See text accompanying notes 65-69, 99 supra.
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may reach other states, also affects one of Congress' enumerated
powers for which there is no corresponding regulatory scheme.
Due to the relative abundance of energy resources as compared
to the population of Wyoming, it is clear that these commodities
in particular are being developed to be placed in interstate commerce. Since the Act's regulatory scheme may determine whether
or not a facility can be built and may impose additional costs on
any business desiring to build an industrial facility in Wyoming,
it clearly could be said that the Act has some effect on interstate
commerce, but is the effect enough to invalidate the legislation?
A discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the relationship between the commerce clause and state regulations is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, two basic points emerge
from a perusal of commerce clause cases: (1) State police power
regulations can be upheld even though they affect interstate commerce'
and (2) state regulations, including police power
regulations, which burden, i.e. directly impair or impede, interstate commerce will be invalidated. 4 ' The Supreme Court has
stated that, although the Constitution conferred upon Congress
the power to regulate commerce, it
never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects
relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the
legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country."

On the other hand the Court has also said:
"I E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968) (upholding state law requiring full train crews); Cities Serv.
Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (upholding state order requiring
company to take natural gas ratably at fixed prices although 90% of gas went out of state);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding state law requiring delivery of most of
raisin crop to control committee although 95% of raisins went out of state); South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding state law restricting weights and size of motor carriers).
" E.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964)
(invalidating state regulation which would have barred interstate milk from a major
segment of the Florida milk market); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating
state law segregating races on interstate buses); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating state law regulating length of interstate trains);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 369 (1923) (invalidating
state order requiring that interstate trains be stopped at a small town); Illinois Central
R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896) (invalidating state law requiring trains to stop at
county seats).
"' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960), quoting
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876).
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The State cannot, under cover of executing its police powers, undertake what amounts essentially to a regulation of interstate com5
merce, or impose a direct burden upon that commerce.'

Therefore, assuming that a state regulation results in some burden on commerce, the first issue becomes whether a state police
power regulation either directly or indirectly burdens interstate
commerce. The Wyoming Act does not directly deal with any
particular commodity but rather deals with the selection of sites
which could then be used to produce a commodity. Under the
"mechanical test" the Wyoming Act is applied before any "operation of interstate commerce occurs" and is, therefore, constitutional.'" Even assuming that the Wyoming Act did have a closer
relationship to any particular commodity, the Act does not prohibit outright any facility producing these commodities but
merely insures that the facilities will be located in accordance
with state interests. Thus, any effect resulting from a particular
site being invalidated would be incidental to the siting process
rather than a natural outcome of the state regulation.
Even though the Wyoming Act does not constitute a direct
burden on commerce there are further tests which the Supreme
Court has applied to state police power regulation. First, the state
regulation must be reasonable. The Supreme Court has articulated this test to be "whether the means of regulation chosen are
reasonably adapted to the end sought."' 47 While this determination is dependent on the facts of a particular case, the Court has
given some indication of what will be considered unreasonable in
the context of interstate commerce. For example, in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit'4 the Court said that a
state may not impose a burden which either discriminates against
interstate commerce or operates to disrupt its required uniformity.

149

Once a determination is made that a regulation is a reasonable means to attain the ends sought, a court is left with a number
of alternatives, although it first must determine whether it should
conduct a balancing test. In 1938 the Supreme Court stated that,
'
"7

Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 524 (1912).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1943).
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).

362 U.S. 440 (1960).
" Id. at 448.
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in the absence of congressional legislation, the judicial function
stops at the inquiry of whether the means of state regulation
chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought. 50 Since that
time the Court has developed a balancing test. 5 ' A fairly recent
pronouncement of this test is found in Pike v. Bruce Church,

Inc. :12
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 5 3

Although this statement appears to require a balancing of interests, the method has not been used by other courts. For example,
in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago,'54 the Seventh Circuit, after noting that there were some arguments for not going
any further once the reasonableness of the state regulation had
been shown, 5 opted to take a middle path:
[If the burden on interstate commerce is slight, and the area of
legislation is one that is properly of local concern, the means chosen
to accomplish this end should be deemed reasonably effective unless
the party attacking the legislation demonstrates the contrary by
clear and convincing proof."'

Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, the test
given by the Seventh Circuit would appear to be as valid as the
balancing test used by the Supreme Court in Pike. The Seventh
Circuit's test, which presumes the validity of state legislation, is
actually a restatement of a precept consistently used by courts in
deciding zoning cases. 5 '
In applying these tests to the Wyoming Act, it is apparent
that the construction permit requirement is not an undue burden
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).
The Supreme Court has struck down state regulations by applying the balancing
test even where the regulation was non-discriminatory. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
152397 U.S. 137 (1970).
" Id. at 142.
509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1980 (1975).
Id. at 75.
• Id. at 76.
The Supreme Court has said that where a legislative body makes a zoning classification which is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment will control. See, e.g., Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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on interstate commerce. It does not discriminate, nor does it disrupt any required uniformity. As to whether the Act is a reasonable means to the ends sought, a permit system, designed to produce decisions based on adequate information, appears considerably more reasonable than outright banning of certain activities,
such as is done in zoning and which has been upheld. 58 While it
could be argued that the denial of a permit does create an undue
burden on commerce, such an argument really goes to the issue
of whether the Act is being applied in a reasonable manner, not
to the issue of whether the Act is invalid on its face as an undue
burden on interstate commerce. If the Wyoming Act is unreasonably applied, it may be59 struck down regardless of whether or not
it is valid on its face.

Another remaining consideration is whether the fee requirements of the Wyoming Act are an undue burden on interstate
commerce. First, the total fees (including the fee for an additional study) can be no more than 1 percent of the estimated
construction cost, with certain lower limits, depending on the
amount involved.6 0 The provisions for a refund of the fees, combined with the fact that no further fees are incurred, indicate that
this burden is slight and the provision would be upheld, even if
the balancing test were applied. Even if the fees were higher, the
Wyoming Act might be upheld, since the purpose of the regulation is social and environmental. In American Can Co. v. Oregon
Liquor Control Commission'' an Oregon court held that a banning of disposable cans for environmental reasons was not an
undue burden on commerce even though the affected parties
would lose considerable amounts of money.' And, the Supreme
Court has upheld state regulations completely banning a particular business on the grounds that the Court would not interfere
where the purposes of the regulation were for the social, as opposed to the economic, benefit of the citizens.6 3
'" See Cadoux v. Planning & Zoning Comm., 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582, cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972); Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township, 37
N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-502.81(b), -502.83 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
"I

15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973).
!d. at 625-27, 517 P.2d at 695-96.

"'

Breard v. Alexander, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)(banning door-to-door soliciation).
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Thus, under traditional Supreme Court tests the Wyoming
Act appears not to be an undue burden on interstate commerce.
This conclusion is reinforced in the light of a June 1976 Supreme
Court decision which represents a turning in the Supreme Court's
treatment of state regulation and the commerce clause. National
League of Cities v. Usery"4 concerned 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act which applied minimum wage requirements to almost all public employees employed by the states and
various political subdivisions. In overruling its decision in
Maryland v. Wirtz,'65 made eight years earlier, the Court stated:
We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditionalgovernmental functions, they are not within
the authority granted Congress by [the commerce clause].'

Thus, although the Court specifically recognized that Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce is "plenary,"'"7 it held that
it was not absolute. The Court's reluctance to use the commerce
clause to invalidate state regulation of "traditional" functions
could just as well be applied to such other traditional functions
as the exercise of the police power.
IV. PUBLIc LANDS
The third situation in which federal prerogatives may
preempt the operation of a state regulation occurs when the state
regulation affects public land. The term "public land" as used in
this note does not include all federally owned land, as "Article I"
lands, which the government owns, are inherently excluded from
state regulation. "Article IV" lands, on the other hand, may be
the subject of concurrent state and federal control, "' and, thus,
will be dealt with in this note.
"1

96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).

"'

392 U.S. 183 (1968).
96 S. Ct. at 2474 (emphasis added).

Id. at 2468.
Federal lands may be roughly divided into two categories. What may be termed
"Article I" lands are those lands purchased for the erection of "forts, magazines, arsenals,
drydocks, and other needful buildings," over which the Constitution gives the federal
government full legislative authority. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The second category
'"

of federal lands, which may be termed "Article IV" lands, encompasses all other territory

and property belonging to the federal government. Over these lands, the Constitution
gives the federal government the power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and

Regulations." Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Federal authority over Article IV lands, rather than
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The question of jurisdiction over federal land is of particular
importance to the Wyoming Act, because federal lands comprise
almost half of the area of the State of Wyoming."' In addition to
owning considerable land in fee simple absolute, the federal government has, since 1916, transferred land to private ownership
but reserved the rights to the minerals which lie below the surface. 70 Thus, the combination of the high percentage of federal
lands in Wyoming with federal ownership of key energy resources
means that almost any state regulation of energy development
facilities in Wyoming will involve federal property.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a state's police
power does extend over public lands. 7' However, the Court has
qualified this statement to the effect that Congress has unlimited
power to control and dispose of the public lands.'72 The relationship between these state and federal powers over public lands is
perhaps best described by one federal district court:
[T]he authorities treating with the matter of exclusive control of
federal lands by the Federal Government clearly and definitely hold
that State law and the State police power extends over the federal
public domain unless and until Congress has determined to deal
exclusively with the subject.'73

Although the Supreme Court has consistently asserted that
Congress' power over federal lands is "without limitation,''' 7 this
being legislative in character, as is the express federal authority over Article I lands, is
really proprietary, albeit uniquely so. Thus, this note will deal only with Article IV lands
over which there may be concurrent federal and state jurisdiction.
"I See note 24 supra.

Mineral rights were reserved to the United States in the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970). For a view of the problems that the federal
mineral reservations created see Note, Mineral Prospecting in Urban Areas: A Study of
Surface and Mineral Rights Conflicts Under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, 16 ARIZ.
L. REV. 860 (1974). Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the energy resources of coal,
oil, gas, and oil shale are to be developed only through leasing arrangements with the
federal government. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
"I Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Omaechevarria v. Idaho,
246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918). See also Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277
F. Supp. 366, 369 (W.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 829 (1969).
I'lKleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272
(1954); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389. 404-05 (1917).
"I Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, 369 (W.D.
Okla. 1967) (citations omitted).
"I,Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954); United States v. San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
17o
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has been challenged as an incorrect interpretation of the law.' 7
One commentator has argued that the source of the Court's misconception was Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States.'76 Prior
to this case, the Supreme Court had upheld the enforcement of
state law regarding public lands, with the major exception that
the federal government had an absolute power of disposal regard77
less of state law:'
The dicta, [in Utah Power,] however, disclose an entirely novel
and radically different view of relative state and federal power over
Article IV property. On this view, the exception pertaining to acquisition of private rights devoured the established rule.17

It is clear that, at the present time, the Wyoming Act applies
with full force and effect to federal land. Apart from general
pronouncements by the Supreme Court that state police powers
apply to federal lands, in United States v. Hatahley, 71 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit specifically held
that state law applies to federal lands administered under the
Taylor Grazing Act.'80 Well over half of the federal lands in Wyo,I Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, (Plowshare Technical
Paper No. 3), 2 WESTERN INTERSTATE NUCLEAR BD.-PLWSHARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
LEGAL STUDIES 136 (1973). Engdahl argues that the federal government's power over public
lands is proprietary in nature, and, that, although the federal government under the broad
authority of the "necessary and proper" and "general welfare" clauses can use extraneous
methods to effectuate goals under its enumerated powers, and can use its enumerated
powers to effectuate extraneous goals, it cannot use extraneous methods to effectuate
extraneous goals. Thus, although the federal government can use its power over the disposal of public lands or can use its power to condition contracts to regulate commerce and
provide for the national defense, it cannot use its power over public lands to develop
energy.
'7

243 U.S. 389 (1917).

Engdahl, supra note 167, at 174-75.
Id. at 176-77. Although Engdahl agrees with the outcome of the decision, he says
it could have been based solely on the federal government's absolute right to dispose of
title to its property, rather than on a much broader proposition that the federal government has complete dominion over federal lands. Id. at 176. While Engdahl's argument is
legally sound, it is not likely to be persuasive, in light of the Supreme Court's consistent
1"

'71

position for 50 years. In addition, the argument ignores the fact that the Constitution,
besides granting the federal government authority to "dispose" of federal lands, also
grants it authority "to make all needful Rules and Regulations" for federal lands. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. If the power to "dispose" is one exception to the general rule
that state law applies, it is not very difficult to view the power "to make all needful Rules
and Regulations" as creating a second exception providing the authority necessary to
support the Supreme Court's position that the federal government has broad powers over
public land.
,7, 220 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
'" Id. at 671.
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ming are administered by the Bureau of Land Management,""'
which is primarily responsible for managing public lands under
the Taylor Grazing Act.' Under the decision in Hatahley then,
as much as a quarter of the State of Wyoming is public land
over which state law applies. In addition, the federal courts have
also held that state law applies to leased mineral rights.'m While
it is clear that the federal prerogatives over federal land do not
currently affect the operation of the Wyoming Act, the federal
government does possess the power to supplant state police power
regulation whenever it desires.

V.

RESOLUTION OF POTENTIAL FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT

The preceding discussion of federal prerogatives and the
Wyoming Act indicates that there are definite preemption problems if the Wyoming Act is applied to facilities subject to federal
licensing, specifically, hydroelectric and nuclear facilities. In
addition, a potentially significant problem exists in that the federal government may direct that federal lands be used to further
the national policy of energy development. Legislation effectuating this policy could effectively preempt state land use regulation
over federal lands. Although the state would continue to exercise
other powers, such as taxation of federal lessees, such exercise
would be of little value if the state lost the ability to control the
use of land within its boundaries.
How then should Wyoming, or any state with similar land
use regulations or concerns, assert the right to control land use?
One alternative is to litigate the issue, asserting that the state
regulation is a legitimate exercise of state police power to protect
its citizens through the control of land use, rather than a frustration of national policy.' It could also be persuasively argued that
site selection has not been made the subject matter of federal
regulation.'8
See note 24 supra.
43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315n (1970).
"
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967). Support for these decisions
may be found in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which states:
[Niothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the right of
States or any local authority to exercise any rights which they have ....
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287, 189 (1970).
"I See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
1 Support for this contention is found in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
"

",
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While the federal government has not yet specifically legislated on the subject of site selection of energy facilities,' it has
granted the FPC and NRC licensing authority over the construction of energy development facilities." 7 Whether a court would
consider site selection an inherent part of the construction of
these facilities would probably depend on the particular fact situation; for, while the actual site is crucial to the construction of a
hydroelectric power project, it may be considerably less important to the construction of a nuclear power plant. The outcome
of any litigation in this area is not predictable, and because of the
expense involved, litigation would not be the most satisfactory
means to assert state rights to regulate land use.'88
However, the states could assert legitimate local interests
and work within the framework of the federal system. While the
federal government can legislate to invalidate state regulation
(albeit under strong political and perhaps legal dissent by the
states), it is clear that the federal government can also give the
states the legal right to regulate certain matters of true local
interest. Such authority already exists in certain areas.8 9 One
might say that the question of whether a state could regulate land
within the federal process was answered in First Iowa HydroElectric Cooperative v. FPC, 90 where the Supreme Court held
that these kinds of federal requirements were merely informa218 (1947). Although the Supreme Court held in that case that federal regulation of
warehousemen licensed under the Warehouse Act terminated the dual system of state and
federal regulation, it also held that Illinois law could validly require approval for management, construction, and contracts between licensees and other parties, because the federal
act did not expressly preempt these activities. Id. at 237. Thus, even though it was found
that the federal regulatory system completely preempted the state system, the Court
acknowledged that some activities of the federal licensee were still subject to state regulation.
'" But see H.R. 11066, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) which would have provided for
"State siting agencies" to facilitate federal/state coordination on the siting of bulk electric
power facilities and which declared that issues involving a balancing of regional power
needs with environmental factors should be resolved at the state level. Cf. S. 619, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the administration's Energy Facilities Planning and Development
Act, which expressly preempts state siting laws.
"
See text accompanying notes 66, 119 supra.
"
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
"' For example, the NRC operates under rules and regulations which require its
applicants to provide evidence of compliance with state land use regulation. See note 125
supra.
190 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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tional in character and did not, therefore, grant the state any
power to affect a federal licensee.' 9'
Since the decision in First Iowa, a federal statute has been
enacted which could change the outcome of any future decisions
in this area. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968
(Cooperation Act),'92 which provides the basis for state review of
federal assistance grants under the Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-95,193 contains broad language which could be
the foundation of a federal policy to require federal consideration
of state views. The Act states:
All viewpoints-national, regional, State, and local-shall, to
the extent possible, be fully considered and taken into account in
planning Federal or federally assisted development programs and
projects. State and local government objectives, together with the
objectives of regional organizations shall be considered and evaluated within a framework of national public objectives, as expressed
in Federal law, and available projections of future national conditions and needs of regions, States, and localities shall be considered
in plan formulation, evaluation, and review." 4

While this language is located in a section entitled "Declaration
of development assistance policy,"' 95 it clearly includes a range of
federal programs and projects beyond those providing federal
development assistance. Just as the courts established that the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969'" set forth a "substantive policy" making environmental protection a part of the
"mandate" of every federal agency and department,'97 the courts
could consider the language of the Cooperation Act a mandate to
consider the views of the states.' 9
"' See text accompanying note 75 supra.

1,242 U.S.C. §§ 4201-44 (1970).

"I See generally Sikorsky, Local Control Over Federally Funded Projects, 19 N.Y.L.
FORUM 113 (1973).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 4231(b) (1970).
", Id. § 4231.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
,, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir.

1971).
"I The Cooperation Act does, however, differentiate between federal projects and
federally assisted development. While the section dealing with both types of programs
speaks of state views being considered to "the extent possible," the section dealing with
federally assisted development states that programs are to be consistent with state, regional, and local comprehensive planning to "the maximum extent possible." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4231(c). Whether this distinction would operate to preclude an argument that the

1976
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This interpretation of the Cooperation Act would appear to
fill present gaps in state jurisdiction to regulate land use. In those
instances where a federal prerogative operates to supplant state
regulation, state views on how the activity is to be regulated
would become part of the process of the very federal system which
supplanted the state regulation. Until such an interpretation of
the Cooperation Act is accepted by the courts, states will not be
able to force federal agencies to consider state views in the federal
decisionmaking process. However, there are several measures
that a state may take to assert its views on matters of state
concern as a participant in the federal process. For example,
states can provide necessary input to federal programs and regulations.'" In addition, states should endeavor to have state regulation be given legal effect within the federal process.200 Although
federal laws and regulations which recognize a state role in the
federal process are few in number, the states should utilize the
political process to encourage both the enactment of federal legislation and the adoption of federal agency regulations which recognize the legitimate role of states in the federal process in matters
of state concern.
Cooperation Act established a substantive policy for the consideration of state views
cannot be known until the question is litigated.
"I U.S. Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-95, 38 Fed. Reg. 32876-77 (1973),
which concerns all federal development activities, requires federal agencies to consult with
state officials and agencies. Also, NRC requirements provide for cooperation with the
states in the conduct of the Nuclear Site Survey. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
" Such recognition of state regulation within the federal process does exist. For
example, Section 401(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(33 U.S.C. 1341(d) (Supp. II 1972)) specifically provides for incorporation of state law into
federal permit programs. Also, the Army Corps of Engineers, under its authority to issue
permits for activities in navigable waters and ocean waters, on July 25, 1975, published
interim final regulations which recognized a state role in the regulation of navigable
waters. 40 Fed. Reg. 31319 (1975). The new regulations provide that, if a permit is being
sought from the Corps of Engineers for an activity for which state certification or authorization is required by federal, state, or local law, and if the certification or authorization
is denied by the state, the Corps of Engineers will deny the permit. Id. at 31327. The intent
of the Corps of Engineers to include a state role in its permit process is clear from the
letter of explanation which accompanied the publication of the new regulations:
We believe there is considerable merit in having the States become
directly involved in the decisionmaking process to the maximum extent
possible.
Id. at 31322.
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CONCLUSION

An analysis of the Wyoming Act indicates that this Act and
similar statutes of other states could be limited by federal prerogatives when the state regulation pertains to facilities actively
regulated by federal agencies. In the case of the Wyoming Act,
these facilities are hydroelectric power projects regulated by the
FPC and nuclear facilities regulated by the NRC. As long as the
application of the Wyoming Act does not present a pattern of
obstructing a major segment of interstate commerce, the application of a balancing test would indicate that the Act does not unduly burden interstate commerce. As to the question of the effect
of state land use regulation on public lands, there is presently no
difficulty, but herein lies the greatest potential for federal-state
conflict, should Congress decide to direct specifically how public
land is to be used for energy development.
In the face of these federal prerogatives, the states have two
basic alternatives: Litigate to assert the right to regulate matters
of state concern, or try to work within the federal framework to
ensure that state views are respected. The latter approach, using
the authority expressly given the states to comment on federal
projects and activities 210 through the authority of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act,120 appears to be the more practical.
In the final analysis, however, the most effective means to
resolve federal-state conflict and successfully assert the right of
states to regulate land use lies in the political process. The states
should strive to have Congress and the federal agencies grant the
states express authority to regulate activities of significant local
impact which call for the exercise of the states' police powers. As
the tenor of the Supreme Court becomes more receptive to the
states' role in the federal system, the states may find that litigation will become more effective.
Louis J Marucheau
2' See text accompanying note 189 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 182-87 supra.

